Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2010

Sandra Poll v. James Cook Poll : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brent Young; Ivie & Young; Attorneys for Appellee.
Matthew R. Howell; Fillmore Spencer; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Poll v. Poll, No. 20100765 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2509

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SANDRA POLL,
CASE NO. 20100765-CA
Petitioner-Appellee,

JAMES COOK POLL,
Respondent-Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT'S SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE
OF DIVORCE, IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE FRED D.
HOWARD, PRESIDING.

Brent Young
Ivie & Young
226 West 2230 North #210
Provo, Utah 84603

Matthew R. Howell (6571)
FILLMORE SPENCER LLC
3301 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604

Attorneys for Appellee

Attorneys for Appellant

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS
MAP n n 9fli1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SANDRA POLL,
CASE NO. 20100765-CA
Petitioner-Appellee,

JAMES COOK POLL,
Respondent-Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT'S SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE
OF DIVORCE, IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE FRED D.
HOWARD, PRESIDING.

Brent Young
Ivie & Young
226 West 2230 North #210
Provo, Utah 84603

Matthew R. Howell (6571)
FILLMORE SPENCER LLC
3301 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604

Attorneys for Appellee

Attorneys for Appellant

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

ARGUMENT

1

I.

II.

III.

Sandra's Brief Mischaracterizes the Relevant Standard of
Review and the Applicable Marshalling Requirement

1

The Trial Court's Finding of Fact that Sandra Did Not
Intend to Make a Gift of the Wasatch Property Is Clearly
Erroneous

6

The Trial Court Erred in Denying Relief Because James'
Transfer to Sandra of the Wasatch Property "Would
Constitute a Potentially Fraudulent Transfer"

14

CONCLUSION

20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Adair v. Bracken, 745 P.2d 849 (Utah App. 1987)

5-6

Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, 993 P.2d 997

13 n.4

California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970)

12 n.3

Carr v. Allison Turbine Div. Gen. Motors, 32 F.3d 1007, 1008 (7th Cir.
1994)

4

Concrete Pipe & Prod. OfCal, Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508
U.S. 602 (1993)

4

Hone v. Hone, 2004 UT App 241, 95 P.3d 1221

17 n.9

Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980)

13 n.5

Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, 217 P.3d 733

2

N.D. v. A.B., 2003 UT App 215, 73 P.3d 971

4

Olson v. Olson, 2010 UT App 22, 226 P.3d 751

2

Ross'Estate v.Ross, 626 P.2d 489 (Utah 1981)

13 n.4

S.B.D. v. State, 2006 UT 54, 147, P.3d 401

4-5

W. Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818P.2d 1311 (Utah App. 1991)

2-3

Statutes
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(1)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(8)(b)

17
17n.l0

Rules
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)

3-5

Other Authorities
Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)
5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1367
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2585 (1971)

13
12 n.3
5

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SANDRA POLL,
Case No. 20100765-CA
Petitioner-Appellee,
V.

JAMES COOK POLL,
Respondent-Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Respondent-Appellant James Cook ("James") hereby files his Reply Brief in
response to the brief filed by Petitioner-Appellee Sandra Poll ("Sandra"). For the
reasons stated below as well as in James' opening brief, the Court should reverse
the trial court's finding that Sandra did not intend to give the Wasatch property to
James or the marital estate.
ARGUMENT
I.

Sandra's Brief Mischaracterizes the Relevant Standard of Review and
the Applicable Marshalling Requirement
In his opening brief, James noted that an appellate court will make changes

to "a trial court's property division determination in a divorce action only if there

was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and
prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or such a
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion" and that the
"factual findings on which its determination is based are reviewed for clear error."
Appellant's Opening Brief at 24 (citing Olson v. Olson, 2010 UT App 22,fflf7, 9,
226P.3d751).
In opposition, Sandra correctly noted that when an appellate court is called
on to conduct a clear error review, the party requesting such is required to marshal
the evidence. Appellee's Brief at 1-2. Sandra then, however, incorrectly described
that marshalling burden as being so heavy that it is virtually impossible to meet:
Indeed, in an appeal arising out of a bench trial where the district
court relies on live testimony in making its findings, marshalling may
prove to be a near practical impossibility because the district court has
within its perception factors that do not translate well into the record.
Factors such as witness demeanor, body language or other non-verbal
cues that can influence a trial court's findings of credibility and
veracity are difficult, if not nearly impossible, to incorporate in the
record.
Appellee's Brief at 7-8. This is a misstatement of the standard of review and of the
marshalling requirement.
First, the marshalling requirement simply requires "the challenger [to]
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists." Kimball
v. Kimball 2009 UT App 233, f 21, 217 P.3d 733 (quoting West Valley City v.

Majestic Inv. Co,, 818P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. \99\)\

quoted in Appellee's

Brief at 2. The marshalling burden does not require a description of how a witness
was shaking uncontrollably or how the trial judge rolled his eyes and shook his
head when certain testimony was presented. Rather, as required by Rule 52(a) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court is merely required to give "due
regard . . . to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses," a requirement which James fully acknowledges in this matter.
Moreover, Sandra has not identified a single fact that James failed to
marshal. In other words, despite the terrible burden that Sandra insists James must
bear in this matter, Sandra cannot find any flaw in James' carrying of that burden.
Indeed, the most that Sandra can say is that "Mr. Poll may not have adequately
marshaled the evidence that supports the finding." Appellee's Brief at 7 (emphasis
added). If a truly motivated party to the litigation cannot muster a single omission
by the opposing party, no matter how minute, it stands to reason that the burden
has been fully met.
In a similar vein, Sandra argues that "if there is competent evidence
supportive of the finding, the finding must stand." Appellee's Brief at 8. This is
an inaccurate statement of the standard of review. Rather, the appellate court may
reverse a trial court's finding of fact if it is against the clear weight of the evidence

or if the appellate court is firmly convinced an error has been made. N.D. v. A.B.,
2003 UT App 215,^ 12, 73 P.3d 971.
Sandra further argues that, because it involves an appeal from a bench trial,
the standard of review in this case is impossibly burdensome. Appellee's Brief at
7. This too is in error. Our supreme court has given guidance in how this Court
should review the factual findings of the trial court made after a trial to the bench.
In S.B.D. v. State, 2006 UT 54, 147, P.3d 401, the court wrote:
Judge Richard Posner made an able attempt to give practical
meaning to the rule 52(a) standard when he wrote:
It requires us appellate judges to distinguish
between the situation in which we think that if we had
been the trier of fact we would have decided the case
differently and the situation in which we are firmly
convinced that we would have done so. Our scrutiny of
the district judgefs findings of fact thus is deferential, but
it is not abject. As the Supreme Court pointed out in
the Concrete Pipe case, we need not, to overturn a
finding under the clear-error standard, adjudge the
finding "so unlikely that no reasonable person would find
it to be true."
Id., f 34 (quoting Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div. Gen. Motors, 32 F.3d 1007,
1008 (7th Cir.1994) (underlining added; italics emphasis in original) (in turn
quoting Concrete Pipe & Prod. ofCal, Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension
Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993))). The S.B.D. court continued:
Thus, an appellate court may consider whether the findings were
made by ajudgeorby a jury. This distinction matters. An appellate
court must indulge findings of fact made by a jury that support the
&

verdict. No such indulgence is required of findings made by a judge.
We made this point in Walker in the context of interpreting rule
52(a) when we looked favorably to the position adopted by Wright &
Miller concerning federal rule 52(a) that
"[i]t is not accurate to say that the appellate court takes
that view of the evidence that is most favorable to the
appellee, that it assumes that all conflicts in the evidence
were resolved in his favor, and that he must be given the
benefit of all favorable inferences. All of this is true in
reviewing a jury verdict. It is not true when it is findings
of the court that are being reviewed."
S.B.D., 2006 UT 54,135 (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (1987) (in
turn quoting Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2585 (1971)
(citations omitted))).
Accordingly, unlike the review of a jury verdict and contrary to Sandra's
description of this Court's obligation here, an appellate court is not required to
affirm the trial court's findings of fact simply because there is some evidence in
the record that may support them. Rather, it is to examine "the entire factual
record" to determine whether it is "is left with the definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed." S.B.D., 2006 UT 54,fflf38-39.
That is precisely what this Court did in Adair v. Bracken, 745 P.2d 849
(Utah App. 1987). In that case, the trial court made a finding of fact that the
purchasers of a piece of land under a periodic-payment contract had exhibited an
intent to abandon the land when they stopped making the required payments
several years into performance. Upon a review of the record, this court noted that
S

there was evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion, i.e., the failure to make
any payment toward the obligation for three-year period of time. The court went
on to note, however, that there were substantial facts weighing against a finding of
an intent to abandon. These included multiple visits to the land by the purchasers
and the exercise (through a proxy) of a landowner's right to vote at the
organizational meeting of a proposed water rights association. Id. at 851-52. The
court further noted that the opposing party had previously tolerated late payments.
Id. at 852. Based on these additional facts in the record, the court "concluded that
the court's finding of abandonment is against the clear weight of the evidence and,
as such, is clearly erroneous and must be set aside." Id.
James is asking this Court to follow this pattern in this case. James
acknowledges that there is certain evidence in the record that, if taken alone, would
support the trial court's factual finding that Sandra did not intend to make a gift of
the Wasatch property to James and the marital estate. As shown below and in
James' opening brief, however, a review of all of the evidence should leave the
Court with the firm conviction that that finding is erroneous.
II.

The Trial Court's Finding of Fact That Sandra Did Not Intend to Make
a Gift of the Wasatch Property Is Clearly Erroneous
Sandra's incorrect formulation of the standard of review leads directly to her

inadequate analysis of the matter before this Court. She begins by spending pages
explaining all of the evidence that supports the trial court's factual findings.
6

Appellee's Brief at 10-14. Throughout this recitation, she repeatedly states that
there is no "fatal flaw" in the trial court's reasoning. Therefore, according to
Sandra, the trial court's findings must be affirmed.
Sandra cites three facts that she claims support the trial court's finding that
she did not intend to make a gift of the Wasatch property:
(1)

The purchase money for the Wasatch property originated from
Sandra's separate property;

(2)

James did not have access to Sandra's premarital funds except as she
may have given him the money and Sandra and James kept their
property in separate accounts under individual names except when
they intended it to become joint property;

(3)

Sandra's testimony that she did not intend to make the property a gift
to James or the marital estate and that she did not think about putting
James' name on the title when the land was purchased.

Appellee's Brief at 10-11.1 In light of the discussion below, these facts are not
sufficient to sustain the trial court's finding.
First, the fact that the property was purchased by Sandra's separate funds
does not provide any guidance in determining whether she wanted to give property
The other facts cited by Sandra at this point in her brief all relate, not to whether
there was a gift-giving intent, but to whether James acted with unclean hands when
he transferred the property back to Sandra months later. Id.

purchased with that money to James. That is, the source of a gift does not
determine whether it was in fact a gift. Second, that James and Sandra kept their
assets separate except when they put both names on the title (thereby indicating an
intent to make the asset marital in nature) actually supports James' position in this
matter because it is clear that they put both names on the title to the Wasatch
property. Thus, the only evidence pointed to by Sandra that actually supports the
trial court's finding is Sandra's testimony that she did not intend to give the
property as a gift. As shown below, this one bit of conclusory, self-serving
testimony is insufficient to preclude the trial court's finding from being set aside.
In this entire process, Sandra never once acknowledges, let alone addresses,
the actual "fatal flaw" that James described in his opening brief. Specifically,
James points out that Sandra's conclusory, self-serving testimony on direct
examination that she never intended to make a gift of the Wasatch property
(Transcript at 44 ) was directly contrary to the testimony that she gave on cross
examination. As described in James' opening brief, Sandra's testimony is as
follows:
11. Sandra testified that James' name was included on the
REPC and the deed because "[w]e were married, and quite frankly, I
hadn't - 1 didn't think about it at the time." (Transcript at 44.) She
denied that she intended to make a gift to James of half the value of
2

This brief will follow the same convention for identifying transcripts as followed
in James' opening brief.

the Wasatch property. (Transcript at 44.) Then, she testified that she
became concerned about his name being on the property shortly after
they signed. (Transcript at 44.) Specifically, she testified:
Q. Did there come a time when you became concerned about
the fact that his name was on the property?
A I was terribly concerned.
Q My question is did there come a time?
A Yes.
Q When was that time?
A Shortly after we signed the Q Why were you concerned?
A Because I was afraid of just a situation as this, that - and my
parents had told me that this could happen as well as my
trustee. They said these documents need to be in your name.
12. On cross examination, this same issue was covered and
Sandra testified as follows:
Q Did you at any time object to having the property put in both
your names?
A I don't believe at any time I actually stated that objection,
but after the fact I was - it became a terrible concern of
mine, as I stated before.
Q And that was because your parents were advising you that
that was a bad move?
A Well, I knew it was a bad move.

c\

Q .. . Your parents both advised you that it was bad for you to
have it in both names?
A Yes. And my trustee as well.
Q And when did your trustee give you that advice?
A I can't give you a specific date. I don't know.
Q Before - before or A Before.
Q - the purchase?
A Yes. Before and after. Yes.
Appellant's Opening Brief at 15-16 (quoting Transcript at 44-45 and 95-96).
Indeed, Sandra's testimony that she "didn't think about it at the time" cannot be
squared with her testimony that she "was afraid of just a situation as this, that - and
my parents had told me that this could happen as well as my trustee." More
especially, it cannot be squared with the testimony that she was warned by both her
parents and her trustee that she should not put the property in both parties' names.
This inconsistent testimony certainly should have weighed heavily against
Sandra's credibility. More importantly, however, she has affirmatively provided
evidence that supports James' theory of the case, i.e., by testifying that she knew of
the risks associated with placing the Wasatch property in both parties' names but
did it anyway. James submits that, when the party supporting the factual findings

in

of the trial court actually provided testimony that directly undercuts those findings,
that constitutes a "fatal flaw" sufficient to justify the reversal of those findings.
Imagine, for instance, a hypothetical situation in which the defendantappellee was found by the trial court not to be liable for battery and the trial court
specifically found that the defendant is not liable because he did not intend to
commit a battery. Also imagine that at the trial, after the defendant testified on
direct examination that he did not intend to commit a battery, on cross examination
the defendant testified as follows:
Q

You previously testified that you did not intend to commit a
battery against my client, is that correct?

A

Yes.

Q

But isn't it true that you did throw the hammer, right?

A

That is true but I did not intend to commit a battery.

Q

And it is true that you threw the hammer as hard as you could,
correct?

A

That is true but I did not intend to commit a battery.

Q

And isn't it true that before you even started to throw the
hammer, you saw my client standing less than five feet in front
of you?

A

That is true but I did not intend to commit a battery.

11

Q

Is it not true that, as you threw the hammer, you knew or were
reasonably certain that it would strike my client?

A

That is true but I did not intend to commit a battery.

Q

And you were quite certain that if that hammer struck my client
it would cause substantial harm to him, right?

A

That is true but I did not intend to commit a battery.

Given the nature of this testimony from the party that supports the trial
court's factual findings, the appellate court would be remiss if it were to affirm the
trial court's finding by simply citing to the defendant's direct examination
testimony that he did not intend to commit a battery. This is so even though the
defendant repeatedly stated that he did not intend to commit a battery. Indeed, it
would be so even if there were even uncontested testimony that the defendant liked
the plaintiff and did not wish any harm to come to him. The simple fact is that the
defendant in this hypothetical confessed under oath before the court to committing
a battery. His conclusory denial cannot protect him from liability.
This is precisely what happened in this matter. After Sandra first testified
that she did not intend to make a gift of the Wasatch property, she then testified to
specific facts that completely undermine her position. She stated under oath that

3

Cross-examination has been referred to as "the greatest legal engine ever invented
for the discovery of truth." California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting
5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1367).
12

she was warned not to put the property in both names and that doing so would lead
to "just a situation as this." In other words, she was aware of what she was doing
and she chose to do it anyway. That is the very definition of "intend." Black's
Law Dictionary 809 (6th ed. 1990) ("Intend. To design, resolve, propose. To plan
for and expect a certain result."). Because she understood the likely consequences
of the actions that she was taking, Sandra intended to make the Wasatch property
the joint marital property of both herself and James. The trial court's finding to the
contrary is clearly erroneous.
Under any burden or standard of proof, Sandra's own testimony is
sufficiently compelling that this Court should be firmly convinced that the trial
court's finding that Sandra lacked donative intent is clearly erroneous.5

4

Sandra argues that James bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that Sandra intended to make a gift of the property at issue. Appellee's
Brief at 13 n.4, 16 n.5 (citing Ross' Estate v. Ross, 626 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 1981).
James believes that his eliciting of Sandra's testimony on cross examination more
than meets this standard and burden. In actuality, however, it was Sandra's burden
to disprove an intent to make a gift. In Bradford v. Bradford, this Court held that
the transfer of separate property into a joint tenancy with the grantor's spouse is
presumed to be a gift. 1999 UT App 373, % 22, 993 P.2d 887. Because it is
undisputed that Sandra transferred her separate property (in the form of the
purchase money) into a joint tenancy (in the form of the Wasatch property), absent
evidence to the contrary, that transfer must be considered a gift. The only evidence
to the contrary in this case is Sandra's own self-serving, conclusory testimony that
there was no such intent, testimony that she contradicted on cross-examination.
Indeed, Sandra's testimony distinguishes this case from the situation faced by the
court in Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980). In Jesperson, the
court upheld the trial court's finding of no intent to make a gift. There was nothing
1a

Accordingly, the Court should reverse the trial court's finding of fact that Sandra
did not intend the Wasatch property to be a gift to James or the marital estate.
III.

The Trial Court Erred in Denying Relief Because James' Transfer to
Sandra of the Wasatch Property "May Have Been Fraudulent"
Turning to question of the effect of James' subsequent transfer of title to the

Wasatch property to Sandra individually, it is important to note that Sandra has not
contested James' argument that there was no evidence that James intended to
alienate any interest he had in the Wasatch property. Rather, it is undisputed that
James' sole intent in transferring title to the Wasatch property to Sandra was asset
protection, that is, to make it more likely that the property could not be obtained by
some future creditor.
Instead of contesting this assertion by James, Sandra argues that this intent
was so wrong that it was sufficient to deprive James of the right to seek the trial
court's assistance in seeking equity. Specifically, Sandra argues that James has
unclean hands.6 This argument is wrong on many levels and the trial court's
erroneous conclusion must be reversed.

in that case indicating that the alleged donor spouse placed the property in a joint
tenancy after having been warned not to because a dispute over the division of the
property could arise at the time of a divorce.
6

James specifically disputes the characterization of his position proffered by
Sandra. Appellee's Brief at 19 n.6 (referring to James' argument in Appellant's
Brief at 38). James did not concede that his conduct was inequitable. Rather, he
\A

First, the only basis the trial court gave for applying the doctrine of unclean
hands was: "The court finds it would not be unreasonable to conclude that Mr.
Poll's objective would constitute a potentially fraudulent conveyance." James
established in his opening brief that there was no fraudulent conveyance.
Appellant's Opening Brief at 36-42. Sandra has not disputed that. Indeed, she
now argues that "the trial court never concluded a fraudulent transfer occurred."
Appellee's Brief at 16.
Rather, Sandra now asks this Court to "focus[] exclusively on Mr. Poll's
intent." Id. Similarly, she asserts "that Mr. Poll's purpose behind transferring the
property back to [Sandra] was an improper one." Id. at 17. The problem with this
argument is that, even though she repeatedly makes the assertion, as did the trial
court,8 neither Sandra nor the trial ever explained why the placing of an asset into a

merely stated that however one might characterize his conduct, Sandra's conduct
was more inequitable than his.
Sandra argues that the proper standard of review of this issue is "abuse of
discretion." In this, she errs. If the issue were simply whether the trial court
equitably divided the marital estate, that would be the proper standard. Here,
however, the issue is whether the trial court properly found that James' conduct
was so unconscionable so as to properly allow the invocation of the unclean hands
doctrine. Accordingly, clear error is the proper standard of review.
E.g., Appellee's Brief at 17 ("Mr. Poll's purpose behind transferring the property
. .. was an improper one. . . . Mr. Poll's intent was improper."); id. at 18 ("Mr.
Poll's intent at the time . . . was improper[.] . . The transfer of the Wasatch
Property out of Mr. Poll's hands was for an improper purpose.") (citing the trial
court's findings).
1 C

particular ownership vehicle with the hope that the asset might be protected from
future creditors is improper. Of course, if such a placement constituted a
fraudulent transfer as defined by statute (which Sandra has now conceded is not the
case here), the transfer may be undone at the instance of the offended creditor.
That, however, does not mean that an attempt to protect the asset from an as yet
unknown, indeed currently non-existent, creditor is wrong or improper in any real
sense, certainly not in the sense that would raise the doctrine of unclean hands.
Sandra's entire unclean hands argument relies on the idea that asset protection (the
area of practice of a significant portion of the members of the bar of this state and
all other American states) is so wrong that it should be the basis for denying a
litigant justice. Sandra cites absolutely no authority for that position.
In fact, whenever the doctrine of unclean hands is applied, the court is
essentially saying that it would be just and equitable for the court to grant one party
certain relief but, because of something that party has done, that party does not
deserve to receive equity. In other words, in applying the unclean hands doctrine,
a court effectively decides that it is willing to allow an unfair or unjust result to
stand because of some supervening wrong. In order to prevent courts from
becoming participants in truly wrongful conduct, the unclean hands doctrine
certainly has a place in American jurisprudence. That place, however, should be
strictly limited to those situations where its application is genuinely necessary. To

16

hold otherwise would often make the courts party to inequitable results, which is,
of course, directly contrary to the courts' very purpose.
In addition, James has not found a single example of a Utah court actually
applying the doctrine of unclean hands in a divorce case.9 This should not be
surprising when one considers that the legislature has commanded the courts to do
equity in divorce cases. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(l).10 But, as noted above, the
application of unclean hands results in a court not doing equity and nothing in the
statute purports to permit that.
Moreover, in the large majority of divorce cases, at least one of the litigants
could probably legitimately argue that the other has come to the court with unclean
hands. Because of that, it should be clear that the application of this doctrine to
divorce cases would open the proverbial can of worms that could not be easily
9

This further distinguishes the case of Hone v. Hone, 2004 UT App 241, 95 P.3d
1221, which was relied on both by Sandra and by the trial court. Because that case
was not a divorce case, it provides little guidance in how the doctrine of unclean
hands should be applied in this case.
Indeed, Utah's divorce statute specifically grants the trial court the authority to
consider fault in the determination of alimony. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(b).
There is no corresponding provision that allows the consideration of fault in the
determination of property distribution. Under the statutory construction maxim
"inclusio unius est exclusio alterius", the Court must conclude that by not
including property distribution within the provision allowing for fault
consideration, the legislature must have intended to exclude such consideration.
Accordingly, the Court should refuse consider whether James was at fault in any
way in determining whether he should have been awarded a portion of the value of
the Wasatch property.

17

reclosed. For instance, in every divorce case in which one of the parties committed
adultery, the other party could assert that that party has unclean hands and
therefore should not be allowed by the court to seek equity. In other words, any
adulterer would not be entitled to ask for alimony or an equitable division of the
marital property. The same would be true for cases involving those who may have
hit their spouse or their child, or those who spent marital funds without the
knowledge of the other for a purpose that would not have been approved by the
other.
To further complicate the matter, in many divorce cases, both parties will
have behaved badly. In such an instance, if the doctrine of unclean hands is to be
applied, it would have to preclude the court from providing any relief to either
party, a result that is directly contrary to the intent of the legislature in enacting nofault divorce legislation.11
If one were to accept Sandra's characterization of the property transferee.,
that it was like a fraudulent transfer and therefore caused the participants to have
unclean hands), then the problem of both parties in this case have unclean hands.
11

This entire idea would open up divorce cases to the issue of fault to such a
degree that the benefits of the enactment of no-fault divorce by our legislature
would largely be rendered a nullity. Divorce courts would be required to listen to
allegations that one spouse hit the other and the counter argument that it was
purely defensive or it wasn't very hard.

18

If the transfer of the Wasatch property from Sandra to James was fraudulent and
caused him to have unclean hands, then, because the evidence was clear at the trial
that Sandra participated in that transfer knowing of its allegedly fraudulent
purpose, she too has unclean hands.
This Court should not allow Sandra to deprive James of his interest in the
Wasatch property, which was marital property, simply because he tried to protect
that property for both his and Sandra's benefit, and not in any way that has been
shown to be improper or wrongful.

m

CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons as well as those stated in James' opening
brief, James asks this Court to reverse the decision of the trial court, hold that the
Wasatch County Property was marital property and hold that he is entitled to a
one-half interest therein. This Court should then remand this case to the trial court
for entry of an order awarding James one-half the value of the Wasatch property,
as proven at trial.
DATED this 9th day of March, 2011.
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC

Matthew R. Howell
3301 N. University Avenue
Provo,Utah 84604
Attorneys for Respondent-Appellant
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